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A year without war:
First Anniversary of the Ceasefire Agreement

Urgent priorities in the peace process

Excerpts of recent briefing by Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris to the diplomatic corps at the Sri Lanka Institute of International Relations, Colombo on the peace process

I will begin with the main focus of the discussions last week, when we had the fourth round of discussions in 'Nakhom Pathom', Thailand as part of the process which commenced on 18th of September last year in Sattahip, also in Thailand. Now, as we commenced the discussion last week we were aware that considerable progress had been made on the political side.

This was the break through, which we achieved in the third round of discussions in Oslo, just before Christmas. It was on that occasion, that the parties agreed that a resolution of this conflict has to be found at the political level renouncing military means, and also jettisoning, quite definitely, the idea of a separate state.

So we were unequivocally turning our backs on separatism, no were the parties contemplating the kind of arrangements that is described as confederation. That is not a very precise term but its legal meaning is a conglomeration of units in a loose fashion within a structure, which enables the federative units to secede after the holding a referendum.

That is not the kind of arrangement that was contemplated. So, in the third round there was a clear agreement at the end of the session that the way forward lies through pragmatic, arrangement for the sharing of power within the parameters of a federal structure. Mutedly of course there are different nuances and gradation within the spectrum of federalism. Federalism is a spectrum rather than a split.

Details

Consequently, there are details to be addressed, and agreed upon. That of course is going to be an integral part of the agenda, in the subsequent sessions. But there was a clear point of departure. But there was going to be a power sharing arrangement and the basic ideas were there. There would be clear division of functions, powers and responsibilities between the central government on the one hand and the units, the regional administration on the other.

That demarcation, that delineation would be established with a degree of precision and clarity. What is more, it would be done by means of the constitutional instrument, and those are the irreduceable elements of the kind of arrangement that was contemplated during the third session and those are the essential and irreduceable elements. So as we began, the fourth session this had already being achieved, this was behind us rather than ahead of us. But we were conscious that a great deal had to be done on the economic side of things.

It is absolutely crucial for the viability of the process that these developments in the political and the economic spheres must proceed in contemporary.

These are parallel tracks. We were very acutely conscious of that reality as we commenced our discussions in Thailand last week. So consciously and deliberately the focus was on economic issues. It did not happened in advertently or fortuitously. But that is how the parties wanted the discussions to develop on this particular occasion because of the priorities that we identity.

Now we began by focusing upon the practical arrangements with regard to finding money, how it is going to be utilized, the procedures that are relevant for this purpose in order to achieve very rapid results on the ground. There should not be any perception of a disconnect. It is necessary to learn from history. There were many reasons why the ceasefire, which existed from 8th of January until 19th of April 1995, broke down. There were many reasons. But one major reason was the, not just the perception, but the palpable reality that what was envisaged in the discussions was not really happening on the ground.

At that time one of the critical issues was the lifting of the embargo, and enabling essential goods to find their way into the North. But even that was not happening, as it should. This naturally triggered off tensions of very considerable magnitude, which culminated in the collapse of the entire process on the 19th April 1995.

We were determined not allow such a thing to happen again. What I mean by disconnect is the perception that things are moving rapidly as far as the political side of things is concerned. But it is accompanied by 'lethargy inertia' inactivity on the ground.

As far as the day-to-day problems of the people living in the areas ravaged by the war, our concern is that this disconnect would be exceedingly dangerous for the future of the process. So that is why we decided that this was the priority to be addressed at that particular time. The first thing to do then, first to make a decision of the custodianship of the fund. We made the decision within a matter of an hour or so.

There were some issues to be clarified with the World Bank, with whom the agreement was going to be signed and some other technical issues, which were rapidly resolved. And a firm decision was made that the World Bank would be the custodian of these funds. There were then some problems arising from the fact that no fewer than seventeen departments and other institutions of the Government were involved in the activities that were the subject of discussion. And the apprehension was legitimately entertained that this 'plethora' of institutions may slow down, inhibit the process.

There was considerable discussion with regard to that matter and right now at the PM's request the AG and I are formulating some legislation to deal with these issues. In order to enable a central authority that is set up with commission to cut through the red rape, overlapping functions and to ensure effective delivery of the services that are contemplated essential to give relief to the people of those areas. So that this is happening. When there was a comprehensive programme of action that was agreed upon with time frames that are capable of being monitored and verified, we agreed that preliminary arrangements with regard to funding and the arrangement of the funds would be completed by the 20th of January.

That is just in three days time. By the 31st of January we will precisely identify all the buildings, which will be vacated by the armed forces in the Jaffna area. That is by the 31st of January. By the 7th of February we will complete a "Needs Assessment" of the area, a physical needs assessment. And seven days later on the 14th of February, we will come out the detailed programme for addressing the needs that have been so identified. So it is in programme in four segments and agreement was reached between the parties on this matter.

When we came to the issue of the High Security Zones; now a few fays before the talks actually commenced in Thailand there had been considerable discussion in the media about this aspect to the problem which appeared to be some what violate, because there had been rather emphatic statement which had been made by the LTTE with regard to this matter. That this is going to be almost a sole subject for discussions, nothing else needs to be talked about until this is resolved.

And that was exceedingly helpful. When we began the issue, when we began discussion of the issue relating to the High Security Zones, we were able without undue difficulty to reach agreement with regard to a practical course of action. We recognize that the number of people affected outside the High Security Zones is considerably larger that the number of people within the High Security Zones.

Now first of all I must refer to a certain misconception, which had been in currency in the media during this period. The LTTE categorically asserted last week, as indeed they have done in past, that has to be stated in fairness to them, they said that they were not asking for the withdrawal of the army from the Northern peninsula, or from or indeed from any part of the Northern peninsula.

They were not demanding that, nor were they calling upon the Government to dismantle or to place down army camps or installations. That was not their position. What the LTTE was saying is that that re-settlement of the internally displaced persons is indisputably an issue of highest considerable priority.

We agree with that. With regard to that matter there is no dispute at all. This is one of the most distressing consequences of the war which has gone on for almost two decades. The LTTE was saying, this has to be viewed quintessentially as a humanitarian problem. They conceded that it was for the Government of the country to make to an assessment of the military means, the security requirements. But their appeal to us in essence was that we should make these arrangements in a manner that does not militate against the voluntary decision of the persons affected to return to their former farms.

The entire exercise is founded upon spontaneity and obviously people would not decide to go back unless you engendered an atmosphere that was conducive to their return. So, that is essentially what the LTTE was saying. We therefore decided to start with the areas outside the High Security Zones and without any difficulty we agreed upon a series of preliminary measures, which have to be embarked upon, before conditions could be established against the backdrop of which the return of internally displaced persons was a practical possibility.

essential

There were three preliminary steps, which were essential. First and foremost de-mining. There had to be clarity with regard to that, that these areas were physically safe for people to return to. Secondly there have to be clarity with regard to the boundaries of immovable property. And we also have to be certain that the people who were seeking to return were the people who were, originally in occupation of these properties.

Not new people coming under the guise of internally displaced persons. Thirdly, there was clearly an obligation devolving upon the Government to provide basic infrastructure without which the persons who were proposing to return would not find it practicable to do so; water or the electricity facilities of that kind. Now this was to happen immediately. There had to be tangible progress in the regard. And as soon as we returned from Thailand, my colleague Hon. Milinda Moragoda and I fully briefed the PM and within 24 hrs, the PM convened the meeting which was attended by representatives of all the relevant institutions, in which we began work with regard to the preparation of the programme that I spoke to you about and the extreme urgency of this was clearly recognized by the Govt at the highest levels.

Security

As far as the situation within the High Security Zones was concerned, it was agreed that we would await a detailed technical assessment of the situation by General Sathish Nambiar, who of course has a very extensive knowledge and experience of these matters, particularly because of his experience in Bosnia. So we are awaiting that report which will be in our hands within the next few days and we would then be in a position make detailed decisions with regard to arrangements which are possible within the High Security Zones without in any way jeopardizing vital security interests.

Now here is something, which we clearly understood and acted upon on this occasion. It is this, that in a negotiating process, that is as delicate as this, obviously there are going to be disagreements between the parties. I stated this with emphasis at the cabinet briefing yesterday that the Government of Sri Lanka will not hesitate to take a clear stand, an uncompromising stand, where the security interests of the nation or vital interest of another kind require that action to be taken. We will not do so merely for the sake of posturing. But we will not fling from it; we will not be deterred from that course of action where we are convinced, that these circumstances that we are dealing with warrant the adoption of that course of action by the reprentatives of the Govt. of Sri Lanka.

Not withstanding the gloom, the pessimism that was entertained by, entertained in some quarters, and the prognostications that were made, the parties were able, given a spirit of maturity and commitment to the process to resolve these matters without acrimony, without undue tension. It was robustly a practical approach. Do what you can immediately to provide relief to a very large number of people. Do not postpone beneficial activity of that kind while you are engrossed in a debate about other issues. Those issues are certainly not going to be swept under the carpet.

They will be addressed in a spirit of candour. But while you are doing that do not desist from actually carrying out on the ground a program of action, which without any vestige of doubt is going to be immense relief to people who has suffered so much anguish as a direct consequence of war. Now that is the proposition, which has only to be stated for its inherent rationality to be immediately manifest.

That position was concerned by the LTTE on the clear understanding that the Govt. was not Shelving or refusing to address problems connected with the High Security Zones. But the LTTE also conceded at all times that it is for the Govt. of Sri Lanka to make its own independent and objective assessment of the security requirements and that is not a position that they were seeking to controvert or denying in any manner whatsoever.

So that was the basis on which we reached what I consider to be a very satisfactory practical agreement with regard to the matters impinging upon the High Security Zones. Now the parties were also conscious of the fact that there has to be a focus on the upcoming Donor's Conference, which is a very major event by any standard that would be held in Tokyo, Japan, in the middle of June.

Now that, of course, is going to be a much more ambitious, a more extensive undertaking than the Oslo Conference of Donors which took place in December last year. There are many differences in concept and in approach. The Oslo meeting was tentative and short-termed.

It had a limited objective. We were seeking only to generate sufficient resources to support and sustain development-oriented activities for a relatively short period of approximately six months, as we prepare for the major The first is there had to a conclusion of the process when we are in a position to formulate a formal agreement, we will incorporate in that agreement clear provisions enshrining or encapsulating Human Rights both individual and collective.

These will not be rights which are exclusively civil and political rights they will envelop, they will extend to social and economic rights and this would be one of the major component of the Human Rights programme. Secondly, the application of Human Rights will not be restricted to the final agreement, but will govern the process during the negotiating stage. So, it is not something that we are postponing or holding in suspense until the conclusion of he negotiating process.

There again it was agreed to, it was accepted by the LTTE. Thirdly, one of the features of the human rights programme to be formulated in consultation with Mr. Ian Martin was the inclusion of some appropriate enforcement machinery, in order to ensure that the provisions which are spelt out are not genial pious aspirations remote from reality. So that is the basic conception of the Human Rights programme as the embryo, as the nucleus of it emerged from the preliminary discussion of that subject in the session that was just concluded.

attitude

Now, I need to say a little bit more about the LTTE's attitude to these issues. We have to be conscious of the fact that the LTTE today is engaged in a metamorphosis from a military organization to a political organization. That is always an excruciatingly painful process.

They are now beginning to grapple with complex legal and constitutional issues, which are obviously outside the range of their experience, so far. They therefore need considerable support in this field, more confident they feel, the more convinced that they are, they have access to experts in this field, the quicker, the more rapid, the process is going to be.

Both the effectiveness and the alacrity of the process are bound to be affected by some perceptions on the part of the LTTE, that they are vulnerable, that they have to be defensive and that there is no way of obtaining competent advise on suggestions with regard to constitutional issues which are put forward by the other side.

That is why an input by persons having expertise in this field and persons who enjoy the confidence of the LTTE is absolutely necessary to carry the peace process forward at this stage. In that context I would like to acknowledge the value of the work that is being done by the forum of federations.

On the last occasion we were privileged to have with us Mr. Bob Ray, the former Premier of Onterio who was accompanied by Dr. David Camaren, a political scientist of established reputation from the University of Toronto. Now I know that the LTTE interacts very fruitfully and cordially with them, and the process is greatly facilitated by the ability of the LTTE to benefit from the expertise that is put at their disposal by the representatives of the forum of federation.

Ian Martin, we are convinced, will play a similar role in Thailand next month. We have also invited Prof. Geffry Sak with whom the PM, Minister Moragoda and several of us interacted a couple of days ago in Colombo, he is at present the Director of the Earth Institute which is part of the University of Colombia and focusing on some broad economic issues which are relevant to the peace process and we made to him the suggestions that he should arrange a representative of his institute to be with us in Thailand next month to share some of these insights with the LTTE as well.

We think that would be relevant and useful. So that is something desirable, it is something that is happening and it is helping to accelerate the process. We now come to one another subject that is important, that is a need for a certain inclusivity of approach with regard to other shades of political opinion in the South of Sri Lanka.

In that context we are greatly heartened and encouraged by the; can't call it the all party mechanism, but it is an initiative in which the vast majority of political parties sitting in the Sri Lankan Parliament are now participating; this is an initiative on the part of the MPP to look at constitutional models and structures in several European countries - Austria, Germany, Italy and other countries, not to emulate uncritically the structures that are established in those countries but to extract from that experience elements which suitably adopted and developed would provide a foundation for addressing the complicated problems that we are grappling with in our own country.

Healthy

Your Excellencies are aware that three senior members of the PA have joined the group. We consider that to be very healthy and refreshing. Because it will provide a pleasant and non-confrontational setting in which two things we hope would happen. One is that MPP belonging to these different parties will be able to share their thoughts and perceptions with regard to these matters and secondly they will have the opportunity of interacting in an equally informal sense with representatives of the LTTE, who will also be participating in this exercise. So that is very useful. Now we think that though desirable that is only a beginning.

It is only a departure. We have to consolidate other structures and mechanisms that would strengthen that kind of approach which is surely a sine qua non of success of any practical sense in the endeavour that we have embarked upon.

With that in view we are now giving practical expression to some of the salient ideas contained in the speech which Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe delivered to the University of Kiyoto during his recent visit to Japan. That is we are; I don't have every long experience in that area but I have been in Sri Lankan Parliament since 1994, now during those nine years what I have seen is that there is a very considerable difference between the atmosphere that prevails in the Chamber of Parliament and the atmosphere in which we work in the small committee.

The adversarial political culture which has been the bane of our country is not in much evidence in the committee settings. We are therefore trying to move rapidly towards the emergence of a new political culture, to give that process an added fillip and impetus by strengthening the structures connected with Sub-Committees of Parliament. We are therefore proposing to amend the standing orders of Parliament. That is a relatively simple exercise.

That has been accomplished very easily, very swiftly with the agreement of all the major actors because there really is not fundamental difference of opinion with regard to this matter.

Everybody agrees that there are things that need to be done and many of those things can be done by simple amendments to the standing orders of Parliament. So, yesterday I gave details of the five Oversight Committees, which we are thinking of. One has to do with Governance rectitude, probity, effectiveness and some of it will deal with the Public Service. Secondly, the peace processes itself, thirdly they are separating from the peace process, the broader aspects of national reconciliation.

Fourthly the entire gamut of issues connected with the 'Regaining Sri Lanka's Programme and five the problems of the aging population. So, those are the five Oversight Committees and we hope in that setting it will be possible fro MPP belonging to different parties straddling the political spectrum to work without any acrimony and rancour. I think that is a legitimate expectation. It is capable of being accomplished. Then I conclude with one observation. It is this, that we have to tell the media at this point.

I am certainly against restricting media access. I think plenitude of information is very important. The public must not get the impression that these discussions are taking place in a clandestine or futile environment remote from the public gales. That would not be helpful at all. Media must have access. At the same time the media much recognize that a dramatic break through, some sort of announcement, which would hit the headlines cannot realistically be expected at the conclusion of each round of discussions. So there has to be a conscious and a deliberate lowering of the threshold of expectations.

expect

We were able; we did not really expect that, to achieve those dramatic breakthroughs in the first three sessions, particularly the third. But now that we have begun to deal with the substantive issues within the framework that was established in the third meeting in Oslo, obviously the process is going to take time. We are dealing with the nitty-gritty of constitution making and other issues.

It would therefore be a mistake for the media to want to know every two hours, what has happened, what is there that they can report, that would not be a practical approach to the rest of the process. But subject to that caveat, subject to that reservation I think uninhibited media access, full, complete media access is certainly desirable. So those are the main observations, which I wish to make to Your Excellencies on this occasion.

I think now we have arrived at a point in the peace process at which we can justifiably say that some of the basic elements have fallen into place. We have begun to talk to each other; in a spirit, which is noticeably different from the atmosphere which prevailed when we started this process four months ago.

There is less suspicions, there is a greater rapport and above all there is a realisation that although there will be difficulties, and sometime even formidable difficulties which will naturally and inevitably arise from time to time, that will not imperil or endanger the continuity of the peace process. This is because of the depth of commitment to the value of the process.

That it is absolutely necessary to the people of our country. And that feeling is very much there on the part of the LTTE and we saw unmistakable evidence of it on the last occasion when issues which were volatile, emotive, controversial arose from our discussions, and we find that a very refreshing and redeeming feature. Let me thank you for your presence here this morning. It is good of you to have turned up, accepting our invitation on a public holiday.

interacting

I am sorry to trespass on your time today. But since I have to be out of Colombo on Monday and Tuesday in the North Central Province interacting with army officers for example, school teachers, the members of civil society, the local entrepreneurs in those areas to explain to them, as I am explaining to you what we are doing.

That is very important; because we are quite convinced that if this is to succeed we have to spend as much time on work around the process, as work that is specifically directed towards the track one negotiations. So I will be doing that over the weekend in Colombo and Monday, Tuesday in the North Central Province and then thereafter I have to leave for Switzerland to attend the meeting in 'Davos', because that again we considered to be important for this reason, that although we are very gratified about the level of support which we are receiving from the Governments all over the world, that really is a source of great encouragement. But we are also conscious that for sustainability we cannot rely on, once for all grants or concessionary loans by foreign governments.

But we really have to interest the private sector in the opportunities that are available for participation in the economy of our country. I am very glad to note that about 35-40 of the largest companies in the World have accepted the invitation of the Government of Sri Lanka to meet us in 'Davos,' that meeting will take place on Monday the 27th before I will be having some bilateral meetings with the Government of Switzerland.

Now meeting with the private sector is very important, because we need to bring to their attention the unique opportunities that are now available in this country, particularly for the re-building of infrastructure, in those parts of the country which have been ravaged by the war.

Road blocks to peace remain

by Batty Weerakoon

There is no question that the uneasy peace that has been achieved through the ceasefire MoU has to be taken forward and consolidated despite the difficulties that are encountered on the way. The difficulties are inevitable and arise from the fact that the monitored ceasefire is not an end in itself.

It is an exercise that is expected to build confidence between the Government and the LTTE - which on the larger screen is confidence and good faith between the Sinhala and Tamil people with it being made possible for the Muslims in the EP to be able to also feel that they are beneficiaries to an equal extent and constitute no mere pawn in the game.

Early in the day the LSSP foresaw the difficulties of carrying through the process that had been set out. On the one side there is for successive governments in Sri Lanka the need to function within a parliamentary set up in which communal forces have always acted most irresponsibly with even purportedly national political parties using the 'black hundreds' to disrupt all peace initiatives. On the other side is the LTTE which is a monolithic organization that is wholly a military apparatus with its own political agenda. It is misleading to call it a guerilla organization because what is characteristic of the latter - popular mobilization - is not a virtue the LTTE possesses.

It is in this setting that the LSSP proposed at the very outset that there be set up a Parliamentary Select Committee under the chairmanship of the Leader of the Opposition to oversee the ceasefire monitoring process. It also proposed the setting up of a national body that is representative of political parties and interest groups that accept the peace process. This latter was meant to promote a degree of transparency as it could give to the process the means to have civil society actively involved in it in the South as well as the North and East.

The Government appeared to think well of the proposals but it failed to pursue them. The block to this was a confidence which the Government's top leadership showed in its belief that finally matters will straighten out in accordance with a predetermined plan or strategy.

We need no longer speculate on what the source of this confidence is. It has now revealed itself. In his address made a few days ago to a Centre for Strategic and International Studies on Sri Lanka's prospects for peace Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State, has revealed the course the international community led by the USA has laid for our peace process.

It is one that leads to a preordained solution which is known to us as autonomy and is stated by Armitage in his restatement of it in LTTE terms as "internal self determination based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka." This in fact is no formulation which we owe to LTTE genius. It is an internationally respected solution for ethnic conflict in unitary states. Accepted as the stage beyond that is what is now called 'external self-determination' which of course ends with separation. It comes as the ultimate consequence of intransigent chauvinist politics on the part of a dominant ethnic majority and is in no way a solution to a country's ethnic problem. It is the division of a country under the aegis of the 'international community' as did happen in Yugoslavia.

The US approach to the LTTE as expressed by Armitage is counter productive. Armitage sees the LTTE as a political agent that can renounce its terrorism at will and yet maintain itself as the hegemon in Tamil politics. This is wishful thinking and it sets up quite innocently the most dangerous road block to peace. To satisfy Armitage on the matters he looks for the LTTE has only to go through the motions of renouncing its terrorism.

The next one year or two is likely to be spent on this whilst all the time it is engaged in the clandestine activity of strengthening itself militarily for the advanced stage of the struggle which will be on the ground that the 'Sinhala nation' or State is unwilling or is in no position to grant to the Tamil people the right of 'internal self-determination'. It is most likely that in such situation the 'international community' which is now possessed of our problem will have no alternative to accepting that the LTTE struggle for separation is justified.

The LTTE's open violation of the ceasefire MoU can be seen as part of its agenda in which the present ceasefire is used to launch its avowedly separatist round of the ethnic struggle. Neither the Government nor the main opposition has a strategy to counter this possible development. The relative freedom with which the LTTE is engaged in its current activity of arms build-up, child recruitment, and extortion and intimidation of Tamil and Muslim political opponents has its predictable reaction in the South which is a build up of opposition to the peace process.

The LTTE's activity and the Southern reaction to it are both major road blocks to peace. It appears that the LTTE is well aware of this situation and exploits it for its purposes.

The most significant road block however is the inability or unwillingness of the Government and the President, who also leads the main opposition in Parliament, to act together in countering the LTTE in its tactics and strategies. The LTTE banks on the fact that these are parties that cannot work together on the ethnic problem. Each in its turn when in the opposition stymies the other in Government in its attempt to solve the problem and thereby keeps alive and active both Sinhala communalism and the LTTE.

(The writer is the General Secretary of the LSSP)

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