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by Professor Laksiri Fernando, University of Colombo

The LTTE - at centre of conflict

The peace process in Sri Lanka has undoubtedly come to a situation of stalemate at present and requires a breakthrough to restart negotiations irrespective of what happened in Kollupitiya recently. This stalemate first came about more than a year ago when the LTTE was not allowed or invited to participate at the Washington donor conference by the previous UNF government where major matters with regard to reconstruction and development were supposed to be discussed.

Of course, there were technicalities involved regarding the LTTE participation in Washington since the LTTE was, and still is, a banned organization on American soil.

Having known this matter, the conference should not have been scheduled to be held in Washington in the first place since the participation of the LTTE at that conference was important.

The conference did not intend to discuss development aid in general or in isolation of the Northeast. On the contrary, a major focus of the conference was supposed to be resettlement, reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war-ravaged areas, without of course neglecting the overall development needs of the country.

It was correct that the Washington meeting was a preliminary gathering, prior to the Tokyo donor summit. However, that was not a valid excuse to exclude the LTTE from Washington, within a context of peace negotiations, claiming that they would be allowed to participate later. Whoever was responsible for this blunder or mistake, it undoubtedly represented bad politics given a process of negotiations.

The reason to highlight the above point at this stage is not just to blame the previous government for the present stalemate, but also to take realistic stock of events and reasons behind the origins of the current impasse. It is also to emphasize that any blunder such as the above, that might appear insignificant at the point it is committed, even in the future might jeopardize any peace negotiations in this or any other country for that matter.

This is not a question of appeasing an organization like the LTTE politically or otherwise, but to do with certain principles that the negotiating parities should faithfully follow in any negotiating process. The principle is that one party should not try to undermine the other party directly or indirectly behind the back in matters that are important in negotiations - and in this case - foreign aid for triple R.

It is also possible that there must have been certain other sticking points between the LTTE and the GoSL by the time that Washington matter or the Tokyo matter came up. As we could all remember, at the first meeting in Thailand, the LTTE quite magnanimously stated that they would not insist upon the demand for an interim administration.

Perhaps they were of the conviction that matters related to resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction could be handled mutually with the government through various committees that they jointly appointed.

It appears, therefore, that the background to the impasse came about mainly because of the failure of the activities related to resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction. In fact, these matters never took off the ground due to various known and unknown reasons.

The known reasons perhaps are related to the lack of political will, bureaucratic delays (if not obstruction), tug of war between various competing ministers and also corruption.

It is also possible that the LTTE did not pay much attention to these matters at the beginning, or did not have much competence to do so, focusing mainly on political and military issues in the areas under their purview (both controlled and uncontrolled).

However, the stark reality, one could very clearly observe even today, is that the ordinary people in the North and the East have not received the peace dividend in any tangible measure. This is a matter that the LTTE as a political organization would have been quite sensitive about.

Economic logic

There was a strange economic logic behind the peace approach by the last government. It simply believed that the opening up of the areas under devastation by the war for market forces would automatically bring about economic uplift to the people.

Perhaps this is another reason why they neglected resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction or development in those areas.

Of course there was a little logic in this approach to mean that the opening up of the market forces was necessary for the goods and services to move around and for the business to takeoff.

The LTTE also was happy about the situation at the beginning because they also could levy taxes on goods if not services to replenish their dwindling coffers. But this had nothing much to do with the people at large. The people were forced to live in poverty without any infrastructure development, necessary to restart their traditional or new means of living. There were no proper plans or initiatives, other than some vague ideas and promises to rehabilitate and resettle those who were languishing in displacement.

In both Sri Lanka and India we have seen, at the last elections, the overwhelming rejection of economic policies that tilted towards the elite and the urban groups completely neglecting the ordinary masses or the rural people in our countries. In a sense, the manifestation of the rejection of this lopsided economic policy occurred in the North before the South in the form of LTTE boycott of the peace talks with the UNF in April 2003. It had lot to do with the way the government wanted to handle economic aid for the peace process.

It was in the above background that the LTTE demanded an interim administration and came up with the most intransigent proposals for the ISGA. It was like a repetition of what happened in Thimpu in 1985. In Thimpu, when the Tamil rebels came to realize that the government delegates, led by H.W. Jayewardene, were completely insensitive and inconsiderate to what they had to say, they came up with the most intransigent Thimpu principles.

It also must be the case that the LTTE doubted the sincerity of the government for various reasons, right or wrong. It is a known fact that many people in the Tamil community by and large believe that the Sinhala leaders are not trustworthy and do not deliver what they usually promise.

While there are certain historical reasons for this perception to exist, it is my view that this is an exaggerated version of a trait that can be seen among many political leaders in this country whether they are Sinhalese or Tamil.

But it is possible that the UNF leadership by and large had a frivolous view of the whole matter, while being very flexible and condescending on the other hand, given their hard belief that the market policy and economic dynamics would do all the tricks in fixing the peace process.

One classic example that we all remember is the answer given by the minister in charge when it was found that there were two versions of their interim proposals" one sent to the President and the other going to the LTTE. The answer given was that while they made an initial sketch, the Norwegians did the final version!

Other reasons

Undoubtedly, it is not only the past that inhibits a breakthrough in the current peace process. Perhaps the LTTE is much more suspicious of the UPFA than the UNF government.

As we all know, the peace initiatives by the PA in 1994/5 period also were a failure irrespective of the keen interest and commitment shown by President Kumaratunga on the matter. Apart from the PA government of that time being quite green in negotiating peace with an organisation like the LTTE (this was equally true in the case of the LTTE), it was also hampered by the issues of humanitarian matters where the PA government was not that flexible, for some reason or the other.

An added reason this time is the participation of the JVP as a constituent partner of the UPFA, still maintaining certain intransigent positions on the ethnic issue. Objectively speaking, the involvement of the JVP in the government is not a minus point but a plus one for the peace process. It has to be acknowledged that the JVP is more or less the southern version of the LTTE or vice versa, whatever the differences they may have in respect of different political issues or organisation practices. Both movements have emerged from similar socioeconomic sources and neglected grievances of the youth of this country.

Therefore, unless and until there is a rapprochement between these two organizations or the forces that they politically represent, there won't be lasting peace in this country.

But of course the LTTE is not concerned about a final solution at this stage and what they are asking for is an interim administration perhaps to see whether they could come to a reasonable solution in the long run on the basis of what they get in the short run. There, they might surmise that the JVP position would be an obstacle.

However, one needs to admit that the JVP has now come a long way in adjusting and readjusting their positions on the ethnic issue and has shown enough flexibility and goodwill that it is keen on a negotiated solution of course within the framework of the country's unity, territorial integrity and common sovereignty of the people.

What is difficult to understand about the LTTE is their continuous habit of placing conditions for talks again and again, perhaps quite detrimental to their interests, as one could see from outside. Some of the reasons for their concerns are clear and understandable, as we have outlined earlier. What is most difficult to understand, from a political point of view, is their reluctance to discuss at least a broad framework for a final solution as the negotiations proceed.

Current impasse

It is obvious that the country cannot and should not go for war. Both parties are (hopefully quite mindful of the situation and that is one reason fortunately why the ceasefire agreement is still holding whatever the breaches in the process.

It is possible that the LTTE would have preferred the continuation of the UNF government for various reasons and mainly because of its soft policy towards them.

However, the people in the country rejected the UNF government at the April election, particulary because of its unpopular (or anti-people) economic policies.

The LTTE under the circumstances did express their willingness to negotiate with the UPFA, but strongly insisted that the agenda should limited only to discussing and their ISGA proposal. They also insisted that they should be recognized as the sole representative of the Tamil people and even this was somewhat acceded, although the whole notion would appear to be undemocratic to any rational person.

The President's position on political negotiations has always been clear, saying that discussions on interim arrangements should be linked at least to a broad understanding of what can be called a final solution although she has shown some flexibility even on this matter indicating that the initial discussions can be limited to ISGA only, if the LTTE is willing to discuss the long term matters or a broad political framework at least when the discussions progress. An interim arrangement canot simply be created within a vacuum or without any direction or anchor.

It is unfortunate that the LTTE has not shown any flexibility on this matter or any other matter in the recent past. In addition, now they have raised the issue of Karuna as a precondition for talks. It is more unfortunate that the leaders of the TNA and some Colombo - 7 NGOs are also of the opinion that all the flexibility and concessions should come from the government side alone.

Possible breakthrough

It is in the above context that one wonders how a breakthrough could be produced within the above impasse. I don't see much of a point in insisting upon political talks, in the short run, if the political differences are insurmountable on both sides as at present.

Therefore, what we perhaps could do is to circumvent the impasse without persisting on the same issues, conditions or agenda items. This is usually called lateral thinking. If both parties are genuine and keen on a peaceful settlement, they should realize the impossibility of the current impasse.

This means to see whether talks could be held on other urgent issues and most importantly on humanitarian issues to jointly work out immediate steps, structures and action to address the issues of resettlement. reconstruction and rehabilitation. These talks might be held under the auspicious or the blessings of appropriate agencies of the United Nations or the donor community. These talks can be held, to talk no politics, but humanitarian issues first.

If we were to go by what the parties to the conflict said when they stopped (at least partially) shooting each other through the ceasefire agreement, the important drive for peace on both sides undoubtedly was the humanitarian tragedy. Therefore, it is equally logical for the parties to address the humanitarian issues first before they venture on to broader political issues.

This might be the only way in my opinion to address the deteriorating security conditions in the East as well. A humanitarian thrust might be able to mitigate the military thrust of the internecine military factions in the East. It is after all the humanitarian tragedy of the war we should be concerned about first that was not addressed properly, in my observation, during the last two years after the ceasefire.

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