How to reconcile the reports

Dayan Jayatilleka

REPORT: Chill out, guys, these things happen, as they say, in the best of circles. I mean the leak of the Committee A or 'majority' report of the experts' panel of the APRC. I was watching and reading sneak previews of the Iraq Study Group report, well before it was handed over to President George W Bush!

Thanks to some nifty foot work by the Sunday paper, The Nation, and the online Asian Tribune, we the people are now less in the dark as concerns the so-called minority or dissenting report of the experts' panel of the all parties' conference.

At first glance the contending reports, those of committee A (the 'majority' report) and committee B (the minority report) are irreconcilable. Yet I would suggest that this is not so, and that it all depends on how you view them.

Fuse not refuse

The majority report is good at one thing, the minority report at another. Each supplements the other, offsetting each other's weaknesses.

The majority report is good at providing a set of reforms for the country's ethno-national problem, and stops well short of the dangerous ISGA and even the reckless PTOMS.

The majority report is also safer than the 'package' offered by Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1995 and 1997. That package cavalierly redefined Sri Lanka as a union of regions, thereby introducing the federal principle.

The majority report is far closer to the August 2000 draft constitution of Chandrika Kumaratunga which was a product of a bipartisan consensus, though Ranil Wickremsinghe later exited from that consensus. In point of fact it was Karu Jayasuriya who led the UNP team for those 14 months of talks with the SLFP delegation (which was led by Prof G.L. Pieris).

The majority report, which grants powers to the provinces which are adequate to satisfactorily address the ethno national question, suggests the dispensing with of the concurrent list. This is also the suggestion made by former High Commissioner and SLFP MP Mangala Moonesinghe, who admirably chaired a parliamentary select committee on ethnic reform, in a newspaper article just the other day. For my part I would argue for slimming down rather than an abolition of the concurrent list of shared powers.

The majority report also contains many safeguards against attempts at secession by a provincial council. This is where the minority or committee B report comes in.

Though it is inferior in its sensibility and sensitivity, vastly deficient in its recognition of the ethnic question and does not provide a viable alternative to secession, it does contain all that is necessary to ensure national security within a scheme of devolution.

It lists the places that should remain with the central government so as to guarantee the vital security interests of the state. It is also correct in its emphasis on decommissioning, and its insistence that the powers of the Presidency remain undiminished. Thus the minority report should not be seen as an alternative to the majority report but rather as complement and corrective.

What is immediately imperative is the fusion of the experts' reports so as to achieve a synthesis. The question is who is to do this. Given what I know of those on the panel, I would suggest the highly respected MDD Pieris and Dr Rohan Perera.

The latter's chairmanship of the UN subcommittee that drafted the UN Convention on Terrorism reassures me that no one betters him in building in a legal framework that is a bulwark against the LTTE's terrorism.

There is a possibility for reinforcing this bridging effort. The four reports have already been handed over to the UNP representatives on the APRC, namely Prof G.L. Pieris and K.N. Choksy, P.C. two minds perfectly capable of generating a synthesis between the various drafts.

Break the chains

For exactly half a century we have had the same dynamics: a (Sinhala) majoritarianism that was unwilling to go far enough in sharing power and a (Tamil) minoritarianism unwilling to settle for that which was feasible and thereby winding up pretty much with nothing. That vicious dynamic must not be allowed to run through the 21st century as it has through most of the 20th, blighting the lives and life chances of millions.

Over the years there were a few proposals that were dangerous: the ISGA and the PTOMS. There were also one or two that were either inadequate (JRJ's District Councils of 1980-1) or imprudently excessive (Chandrika's union of regions package of '95 and '97).

The bulk of the proposals were however of a constructive sort, that if accepted at the time by the Sinhala and Tamil political leaders, would have either forestalled or snuffed out our present torrent of violent conflict and wasted resources (both human and material).

These include the Bandaranaike- Chelvanyagam pact of 1957, the Dudley- Chelvanayagam pact of 1965-6, Annexure C of 1984, the PPC proposals of mid 1986, the December 19th 1986 proposals of the Chidambaram mission endorsed by US Congressman Stephen Solarz, the Indo-Lanka accord and 13th amendment of 1987-88, the Mangala Moonesinghe parliamentary select committee formula (during the Premadasa period), and perhaps the most complete of all, the August 2000 draft proposals of President Kumaratunga.

Today's discussion documents emanating from the experts' panel belong in that same category of constructive, innovative yet safe and pragmatic proposals.

Three wise men

Whatever the hardliners both Sinhala and Tamil say, public opinion polling over the last decade show a somewhat different picture. They reveal consistent support from a majority of our citizens for an enhancement of devolution and strengthening of provincial councils, provided these stop short of federalism.

The experts' panel products correspond perfectly to those specifications. A proposal representing consensus (and consensus is not unanimity) could be sustained by the SLFP-UNP agreement, irrespective of the raucous cries of the perennial hawks. The two major parties taken together, command the support of well over two-thirds of the country's citizenry.

It would be a colossal tragedy to permit a vocal and organised minority of extremists to veto the proposals. All we need do is imagine what Sri Lanka would have been like, where we would all have been, if the Bandaranaike - Chelvanayagam pact had not been abandoned in the face of criticism and protests which were a forerunner of those of today. Today's criticisms are not by the children of '56, but by the children of '57, i.e. of those forces that thwarted the B-C pact!

If the experts' panel and the political parties are unable to fuse the four reports that are on the table, then it is incumbent to call upon an apex group of eminent persons to act as umpires or judges and arbitrate in the matter. I can think of none better than these Three Wise Men: UNESCO Prize winners Judge CG Weeramantry, Anandasangaree and Mangala Moonesinghe.

Failure unaffordable

We cannot afford to fail. This goes not only for the government - the President has promised the world community that a political reform that will settle Tamil grievances is well on the horizon - but the Armed Forces, the state, and the country as a whole.

Engaged in a difficult war in this decisive coming year, our Armed Forces need all the support we can obtain for it globally, through implementing an ethnic proposal. If we Sri Lankans - especially Sinhalese - are still seen to be either unwilling or unable to reform the state in such a manner as to better manage ethnic alienation, the LTTE's case will have been at least half-proven.

For the sake of the Armed Forces and its ongoing fight, we must prevent such external support from accruing to the Tigers, which would be the case if we failed to speedily devolve.

However, devolution should also be safe and saleable. This can be ensured by can building into the majority report, the minority report's security-related stipulations as safety locks.