Boon for Bhutan, bane for Bangladesh

Fruit: Progress in Bhutan, retrogression in Bangladesh. This is the perception thrown-up by fast-breaking political developments in these South Asian states, yet to taste in full the fruit of democratic governance.

While Bhutan is just beginning to experiment with democratic government, through the conduct of a "mock" parliamentary election, Bangladesh, which held out much promise in terms of mass-based, representative, accountable rule, has just begun to slide into a state of political uncertainty, with democratic institutions suffering considerable emasculation.

As we write, the possibility is great that the hitherto chief protagonists in Bangladesh politics, former Premier Khaleda Zia and opposition leader Sheikh Hasina Wajed, would both be relegated to a state of political exile in foreign lands. Already, a murder charge has been slapped on the latter, while the former has been compelled to seek asylum in Saudi Arabia.

Interestingly, corruption is a major issue in both Bhutan and Bangladesh. With commendable political foresight, the Bhutanese monarch, Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuk, has decided to steer his country towards democratic, representative governance and mass politics, but the people themselves are anxious over the possibility of corruption tainting public life under such an order of things.

In other words, democracy is welcome as long as such rule is synonymous with "clean" governance. However, the clearly unexpressed fear of the people is that the monarchy or the traditional ruling elite would be replaced by a new, parasitic, self-serving state class which would be harshly indifferent to the common interest.

Unfortunately, this has largely been the case in most "democracies" in South Asia and Bangladesh's "democratic" rulers too have incurred the same charge: that is, of being parasitic and corrupt. It is this allegation which has offered the military-backed interim administration in Bangladesh the opportunity to suspend democratic rule and postpone parliamentary elections.

There is a confusion of conceptions here. The fact that some "democratic" rulers could turn corrupt and self-serving should not be seen as a sad, devaluing reflection on democracy itself.

Multiparty politics and participatory, representative governance is the best form of governance devised to date and should be continued to be sought after, but corrupt rule is a separate issue. It is not democracy as such that breeds corruption but the lack of rigorous procedures of accountability in some democracies in this region.

Therefore, what must be firmly installed is accountable governance within the wider, democratic framework. This is the task facing South Asia as a whole: the installation of democratic, accountable governance. For instance, everyone enjoying public office should be made rigorously accountable for anything he earns in excess of his legitimate income.

These assets must not only be periodically declared but be open to public scrutiny. Besides, the most rigorous penalties need to be clamped on the corrupt and the law enforcement process stringently protected from political manipulation.

These are just a few ways in which democratic, accountable governance could be strengthened. Democracy should never be seen as inherently corrupting. On the other hand, what is needed is democratic but highly accountable governance.

Hopefully, these issues would be deliberated on by the Bhutanese public in the days ahead. They would need to remember that parasitism is possible under any form of government.

By the same token, it just would not suffice to suspend the democratic process in Bangladesh merely because some in the ruling elite are seen as corrupt. Rather than suspending democracy, these suspects need to be brought to justice by due process, while keeping democratic institutions alive.