A bloody trail of trial balloons

The JVP has come in for most of the criticism following the failure of the JVP-UNP strike of July 10, with the head of its trade union leadership, K. D. Lal Kantha, receiving the most flak for what most left wingers and trade unionists see as the mishandling of the entire strike action.

The UNP, which tagged on to what it hoped was the more popular action of the JVP, appears to have got away with much less criticism, being in this instance, the lesser of the two partners in a strange alliance to defeat the Government.

Apart from the blatant and foolish attempt to give priority to political demands in the strike, ahead of those economic, what earn the JVP most criticism, which even amounted to scorn, was Lal Kantha’s comment when the failure of the strike was obvious, that it was only a trial balloon, and was intended to see the reactions of the working people and the general public to the strike call.

Political commentators and trade unionists have taken the JVP to task for this comment, which as this column said last week, showed how much the JVP lacked in understanding of both the traditions and tactics of the trade union movement, as well as a clear understanding or assessment of the public mood.

This comment was at the core of criticism of the JVP and its bungling of an important political event; and the extent of opposition to it was seen in the many cartoons

 lampooning it in almost every section of the media.

While cartoonists had a field day on how the JVP tested the waters through a possible grave risk to its loyal followers, it also reminded many of how real this was of the JVP’s history of direct action.

It was not difficult for many to recall the first JVP-led uprising of April 1971, when under the leadership of Rohana Wijeweera, who is still held in high esteem by the current leaders and party cadres, the youth of this country were used as pawns to try out its till then, and so far, untested policy and tactics of revolutionary politics.

The result of that trial balloon was the death it brought to nearly 10,000 youth. The toll would have been higher if the then Prime Minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who was targeted for assassination by the JVP, had not insisted on rehabilitation of the JVP cadres who were arrested or surrendered.

If one expected the JVP to have learnt a good lesson from 1971 on why it should not mislead those who believed in its slogans of revolutionary change, the JVP, again under Rohana Wijeweera, sacrificed even more youth and saw much more bloodshed in the second uprising it carried out in 1989/90, no doubt a larger trial balloon.

Shaky pillar

The party is yet to make an apology to the people for these two major political disasters it led the country to in 1971 and 1989, and all the loss it caused to life, limb and property.

But, what July 10, 2008 showed is that this so-called party of the left has yet to learn any lesson from its great mistakes of the past. It is obviously happy to keep misleading the people and dragging them into political exercises in futility, the realities of which it has no clue about, and the consequences of which it cares two hoots for.

In the tradition of fools who rush in where angels fear to tread, Lal Kantha and the JVP are now threatening a three-day strike to win the demand for an immediate wage hike of Rs 5,000 per month for those in the State sector.

The UNP is yet to announce its stance on this new development, but if it once again decides to lean on the JVP; in addition to it doing further disservice to the JVP and the Lal Kantha brigade, it may well find that what it has decided to lean on is a shaky, falling pillar and not the symbol of strength that the JVP was able to project itself as, before July 10.

In any event the UNP will possibly sit out any such strike if it comes before the NCP and Sabaragamuwa PC polls, because the party is in no position to carry on battles on more than those two fronts just now, with all its forces, or at least those ready to risk being seen working for the Ranil Wickremesinghe leadership, being very much strained by involvement in these two polls critical to change the UNP’s dismal record in electoral politics.

The UNP’s problem in the NCP and Sab is clearly seen by its inability to field a person from these two important provinces for either office of chief minister. Provincial politics that have come after the limited devolution of the 13th Amendment, is essentially an opportunity for the people of a province to carry out its own affairs within the limits of the list of devolved subjects, and was clearly an opportunity to throw up provincial leaders who can later come into national polls. With all its limitations, the provincial council system has so far functioned under provincial leaders.

This was the rationale in Rauff Hakeem, the leader of the SLMC, resigning his seat in parliament and contesting for the office of CM in the polls to the first EPC. It is irrelevant that Hakeem’s “sacrifice” of his parliamentary seat has now become a hollow act with his return to the privileges of parliament with little concern for the people of the East, whose cause he has always claimed to champion.

Tussles and suspicion

If the reality in Hakeem’s case is a disillusionment with provincial politics, sans the office of Chief Minister, the problem for the UNP today, appears to be to find persons from the areas where elections are being held who are fit enough for this office.

It cannot be that there are no such promising candidates in the ranks of the UNP in these two provinces, where the UNP has been active in politics from the time of its beginnings in 1947.

But, the reality is that the leadership tussles within the party and the suspicion with which most active members within it are being looked at, have led to the party to choose two outsiders for the key positions in the NCP and Sab, which makes an already difficult contest even tougher.

Ranjan Ramanayake obviously has his work cut out for him to prove his claims to being a “one shot” winner. He is seeking to wear the mantle of Chief Minister that was not very attractive to a more seasoned campaigner and with very strong roots in the Ratnapura District such as Thalatha Atukorale.

The experience of Rauff Hakeem would no doubt have weighed heavily in the minds of persons such as Atukorale in sizing up the prospects of being chief minister or retaining the privileges of Parliament, with there being no openings in the National List to give even some hope of a return to national politics or the parliamentary game.

Although he tries to give the impression of having papered over the challenge to his leadership that came from within the party after the EPC polls, and the UNP’s repeated defeats, the real challenge in the NCP and Sab polls is for Ranil Wickremesinghe, and not for his handpicked candidates Janaka Perera and Ranjan Ramanayake. Those challenging Ranil’s position as leader will be watching the performance of these two candidates, for the developments that will follow the two elections.

If they lose, then the threat to Ranil’s position grows even bigger. But even their victory, unlikely though it seems today, cannot be much comfort for Ranil, as it will be throwing up two leaders, this time with an electoral following, who in turn could pose a future threat to him, with his weakness at the hustings. They will be seen within the UNP as proof that the party still has chances to win if the lead horse is changed.

Although the UNP formed an alliance with the JVP for the July 10 strike, and there were certain subterranean currents at work to see some understanding in the NCP and Sab polls, the fact that the UNP’s candidate Janaka Perera is bound to make the JVP flee from even the remotest possibility of being identified with the UNP in the NCP election.

Whatever the leadership of the JVP may think — below-the-line support may have been considered possible as the JVP, if realistic, would know it has no chance at all - but all that changes with Janaka Perera leading the UNP in the province, being its choice for Chief Minister.

Boasts eclipsed

Even though opportunism of the leadership may make them turn a blind eye to the presence of Janaka Perera and all that he has stood for, the rankers of the JVP, who are not negligible in the NCP, are bound to react with feelings of visceral hate and rejection towards the retired Major General, despite all his claims of having been a hero in the war against the LTTE.

In dealing with the JVP rankers, Janaka Perera has to now live down his own boasts, always subject to much doubt, of his role in the arrest and final disposal of the life and remains of Rohana Wijeweera, that led to the defeat of the JVP’s second failed and misled insurrection of 1989/90.

As to Janaka Perera’s much vaunted claims to heroism in the war against the LTTE and the battle for Jaffna in 1999, these boasts are more likely to be totally eclipsed by the daily reports of the successes the troops are having in the present operations against the LTTE, especially with the fall of the key Sea Tiger base of Vidathalthivu to the Security Forces, earlier this week.

The question that will be uppermost in the minds of voters in the NCP, so close to the battles that are going on today, is bound to be why this person who is being projected as a war hero, is standing for election from a party that is openly against continuing the war against the LTTE, especially at a time when it is seen, not only by Government propagandists, but by many foreign military, strategic, and political analysts, that the LTTE is certainly getting a beating and is no more the formidable force that many said would be invincible.

A little bit of probing is also likely to bring out facts that could challenge the claims, being made by the supporters of Janaka Perera’s candidature, of his being a war hero, especially in the battle to hold Jaffna, that was saved by the truly heroic battle to defend Sarasalai, which was followed with the first attacks of Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers that came to us from Pakistan. It would appear that with regard to both the JVP and the LTTE, the UNP has more of a hot-potato than a cool hero in Janaka Perera.

Black July

Coming Wednesday will mark the completion of 25 years since that shameful Black July, that humiliated the Tamil speaking people, propelled the LTTE into their position of near unassailable leadership in terror, allegedly on behalf of the same Tamil people, and the international support the Tamil separatist cause received, with willingness to turn a blind eye to the blood lust of the LTTE.

The LTTE and its surrogates in Sri Lanka are making all arrangements to mark this 25th anniversary of Black July in a manner that will focus on Sri Lanka in the most unfavourable manner.

This is not unexpected from an organisation that is committed to the destruction of the Sri Lankan State, and the establishment of a separate Eelam, which it hopes will be the nucleus for a larger Tamil State that extends beyond the geographical boundaries of Sri Lanka.

Yet, as the LTTE and its supporters seek to gain new strength from this anniversary of some of the darkest days in Sri Lankan history, there are others too, who in their claim to be opposed to the LTTE and its terror and separatism, are doing no favour to the Sri Lankan cause by their own interpretations of what took place in July 1983.

There are attempts to justify the attacks on the Tamils in July 1983 as reprisal attacks for the military; which can never be endorsed by even the smallest rankers in Sri Lanka’s armed forces. It brings no glory to the armed forces to be told that the savagery of some political goons and marauders let loose on society was a demonstration of support for them.

Since the ugly days of July 1983, the Sri Lankan people have shown commendable calm in the face of much greater provocation by the LTTE than what allegedly spurred Black July.

They have faced the terror of the LTTE without seeking revenge from the Tamil civilians who live in our midst, having their own problems of living under the threat the Tigers and the uneasy situation of a war against terror, directed against an adversary that claims to represent the Tamil people.

There are some who possibly in ignorance, but certainly not in the Sri Lankan interest compare the shameful attacks on Tamil civilians in June 1983 to the storming of the Bastille in France, that remains a lasting symbol of the great French Revolution, and all the progress it brought to human civilisation.

The tone of most of these writers is one of hatred that may have a place in a fascist social order, but not in the Sri Lanka that seeks to find peace and understanding among all its people.

Twenty-five years after July 1983, having seen all that hatred can bring about, what is now needed is a great thrust towards reconciliation. The old wounds may be hard to heal, but heal they must. It is the attitudes of understanding and tolerance, and the desire not just to push July 1983 back into history but to learn the painful lessons that it brings that can take us to brighter dawns of peace and true unity.