For three decades the Police Special Task Force engaged in many dangerous missions. Some of these danger laden tasks took place in remote areas of dense forests. In today’s narrative we discover how these missions were done against the LTTE, and also learn about jungle trekking and trapping. The jungle environment includes densely forested areas, 
grasslands, cultivated areas, and swamps. Jungles are classified as primary or secondary jungles based on the terrain and vegetation. The ability to track an elusive enemy and to recognizesigns in the jungle are valuable skills for STF personnel. Successful jungle attacks usually combine dispersion and concentration.
Guerrilla tactics
The basic guerrilla organization (terrorist) is a three- to five-man cell. These cells are capable of independent action, 
undertaking orders from a high command. They also can be brought together for larger “group”operations, which the LTTE did to change and confuse the Government forces.
Guerrillas are usually weaker than conventional forces in terms of total resources. For that reason, guerrillas will not attempt to overwhelm large units of their opponents in combat. They will instead try to inflict as much damage as possible in lightning actions, withdrawing before the opposing forces can react. Guerrillas are most effective when they strike widely separated targets over a long period of time. Guerrillas are not normally organized or equipped for stand-and-fight type defensive operations.
The LTTE began to defend themselves by moving, dispersing into small groups, or by diverting attention while they withdraw. Years into the conflict they altered their tactics to launch larger assaults. One of the most important needs of guerrilla forces is support. This support came from a number of sources. Food, for example was supplied by political sympathizers. Weapons were gathered from raids on Government military camps. To protect their operations, jungle LTTE units established bases from which they operated. These bases were in remote areas. The bases were duly secured by a combination of outposts and by a grapevine intelligence network established by political sympathizers.
Another area of dormant threat is that of poisonous plants and trees. Water is vital in the Sri Lankan jungle and STF platoons in the jungle had to use water sparingly. However, water from natural sources should be considered contaminated or could even be laced with poison. Water purification procedures were available by using special techniques. Germs of serious diseases, like dysentery, are found in impure water which creates a risk and compromises a mission. All STF teams were wisely trained to prevent heat disorders.
The first priority in preparation for jungle warfare is acclimation (getting accustomed to jungle climate). Troops who are not conditioned properly will not perform jungle warfare tasks reliably. All movements of animals and men are marked by tracks. Combat teams must learn to read signs left in soft ground, in streambeds, trails and near watering places. A few fresh tracks supply information about their maker, direction and probable intentions.
Training to conceal men from ground enemy observation is equally important to STF combat units. Proper use of camouflage will help to make up for an enemy’s superior knowledge of the local jungle area.
Jungle operations
According to STF veteran SSP Athula Daulagala the thick foliage of jungle terrain limits fields of fire and speed of movement. Jungle encounters are often ambushes and surprise raids.In jungle warfare most of the enemy’s effectiveness 
depends on familiarity with the terrain. This means that combat forces native to a battlefield area will be more effective than forces from outside. The LTTE had this advantage, at least in the initial stages. In the Eastern Province some of the jungles were in Kanchikudichiaru (covering Potuvil- Akkarapattu), Lauhugala, Mandoor area (Kalavanchikuddy) and Kokkadicholai bordering a lagoon front. The STF gradually won the trust of all communities.
Reconnaissance operations were always important in jungle warfare. Many offensive operations in the jungle take on the aspects of a reconnaissance operation during the planning stages. This is because the success of offense in the jungle depends on ability to find the enemy. The concealment found in the jungle enables the enemy to operate unobserved by day and night.
The jungle threat’s concept of defense is to trap the attacker by allowing him to move into prepared fields-of-fire. Gunfire is opened at extremely close range, sometimes at 50 meters or less. While the key part of the jungle threat’s defense is automatic weapons positions in bunkers, the enemy will also put concealed snipers in the trees. In this way, the attacker must also deal with the snipers. In the jungle firefight, the side which initiates contact and gains fire superiority in the first few seconds will normally have a decisive advantage.
The STF Small Teams were trained in jungle survival. They were able to deploy from a STF base camp, entering the forest covering 25–30km. They were armed with M-16 assault rifles, grenades and side chargers (explosives). The STF Small Teams took their own rations. The team included an explosives ‘master’ and a lead scout who always carried a shotgun. One of their main tasks was to gather intelligence of enemy build-up and locate supply lines. When required, a STF sniper was attached to the team, to take out a target.
Effective security measures and aggressive intelligence-gathering techniques were mastered by the STF. Food remnants can indicate how long ago an enemy unit occupied an area. Captured documents, equipment, and weapons may provide information. Before conducting a move in the jungle, STF leaders patiently made maps. This reconnaissance indicated possible danger areas, obstacles, and paths or clearings suitable for resupply and casualty evacuation. The thick foliage makes enemy ambush a constant danger. Infiltration can be used with other offensive maneuvers to gain an advantage in the jungle.
Reconnaissance-by-fire is a method where the STF fires on suspected enemy positions to cause the enemy to disclose their position by moving or returning fire. The LTTE used its Johnny mines and claymore mines, connected with trip wires. They also used a “grenade necklace”- a dozen grenades tied and concealed which would detonate when the wire is tripped. These were the dangers faced by the STF.
Tracking is about close observation. STF teams looked for small signs of enemy presence. This is the craft of tracking. Likewise trapping is done to secure the men’s position at night. They used sharp hard bamboo, and planted them as protection along paths where the enemy may advance. In the jungles then men ate MR8 ration packs and chocolates. Most patrols lasted six days.
The Small Team concept was further refined and took on the new name of Cheetah Teams. Quick reaction, stealth and endurance are the core competencies of these teams, just like the cheetah. Pursuit operations were conducted in the jungle to trace the enemy. Aggressive leadership and motivation at the Small Team level was necessary in fighting off isolated assaults and the STF excelled in this arena. Today the STF functions under the prudent and dynamic leadership of DIG Waruna Jayasundara.
Jungles favor raid operations. The concealment enabled Cheetah raiding patrols to operate deep within enemyterritory. Jungle ambushes required high standards of discipline. STF men on ambush remained in the same position for hours at a time, without being able to rest, eat or talk. They endured insects and threat of elephants. STF teams carried anti-venom injections to counter snake bites. In no other operation is camouflage more important than in the ambush. Weapons should fire through screens of undisturbed living foliage. This was how high profile LTTE training camps and cadres were terminated. STF men laid down their lives and we must honour their sacrifice. Today all Sri Lankans have a duty to sustain peace and live together.
